

Terrorist Attacks in Indonesia: Does Terrorism Work?

Submitted 28 June 2024, Revised 22 July 2024, Accepted 22 July 2024, Published 14 August 2024

I Gusti Putu Bagus Pradana^{1*}, Rere Cika Ihza Pamesti²

¹School of Law, University of Leeds, Leeds, United Kingdom

²Department of Criminology, Korean National Police University, Asan, South Korea

Corresponding Email: *lw21igpb@leeds.ac.uk/bagusigp66@gmail.com

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.35879/jik.v18i2.460>

Abstract

This article aims to conduct an analytical examination of the terrorist attacks in Indonesia to assess the success of terrorism. The analysis uses a framework to evaluate the success and inherent advantages from a tactical, organizational, and strategic perspective. Notable cases analyzed include the Bali Bombings in 2002 and 2005; the Australia Embassy Bombing in 2004; the Jakarta Marriot and Ritz-Carlton Bombings in 2009; and the Jakarta assaults in 2016. These instances were selected based on their substantial influence on Indonesian culture and their portrayal of various terrorist strategies and goals. The implication indicates that although certain tactical objectives may be accomplished, there are typically restrictions on achieving strategic and organizational aims. This study explains tactical successes implied by immediate casualties and economic disruption. The study gives some recommendations to enhance intelligence efforts in counterterrorism, cooperation and collaboration with international efforts, and improving the deradicalization program. This insight can be used by policymakers and law enforcers who work with counter-terrorism efforts to make the efforts in Indonesia more effective.

Keywords: Indonesia, Terrorism, Tactical, Organizational, Strategic, Effectiveness.

Copyright (c) 2024 Jurnal Ilmu Kepolisian



This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

INTRODUCTION

A study undertaken by Djumantara et al. (2021) reveals that Indonesia suffered a total of 751 bombings between the years 1977 and 2018. The attacks were conducted by religious extremists based in Indonesia; they claimed to be a Muslim extremist group who wanted to change an incumbent government into an Islamist-based country (Abuza, 2023). Responsible for a significant number of high-profile bombings in Indonesia and Southeast Asia, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) remains a substantial threat despite extensive efforts to combat terrorism (Abuza, 2023). The group was established to establish an Islamic state in Southeast Asia, encompassing Indonesia, Malaysia, the southern Philippines, Singapore, and Brunei.

The impact of jihadist movements on Indonesian terrorism has been substantial, particularly during the 2002 and 2005 Bali bombings. These attacks represented a change in strategy, focusing

on attacking Western interests and destabilizing the tourism economy (Counter Extremism Project, 2023). The Indonesian government responded to these attacks by enhancing its counter-terrorism policies, which involved the creation of Detachment 88 anti-terror, operated by the Indonesia National Police, an elite unit specialized in counter-terrorism operations (Middle East Institute, 2014). Implementing these enhanced measures has had a wide-ranging impact, resulting in the immediate reduction of threats and the establishment of comprehensive programs to counter radicalization.

Jackson (2007) emphasizes that terrorism is a strategic approach to achieving political objectives intentionally and deliberately. This study seeks to investigate the efficacy of terrorism in attaining political, ideological, and organizational goals, specifically in democratic settings. Pape (2003) and Abraham (2006) have constructed the theory and concept to assess the efficacy of terrorism. These theories offer differing viewpoints on 'how terrorism impacts society' and 'does terrorism work?' by analyzing the aftermath of each terrorist attack. Indonesia has performed a variety of strategies to dismantle terrorism, including making changes to its regulations, improving its intelligence capabilities, and cooperating with other countries, notably the United Kingdom, the United States, and Australia. The 9/11 attacks on the United States serve as a global context for understanding the motivations behind targeting Western interests, demonstrating the impact of terrorism on a nation's security policies and economic stability (Bergen, 2021). The Middle East Institute (2014) states that these flexible tactics have effectively reduced immediate risks and tackled the underlying factors of radicalization, hence fostering a feeling of security and trust among the population. Notable achievements include the substantial decrease in major terrorist attacks after 2009, the dismantling of terrorist networks, and the establishment of comprehensive deradicalization programs that aim to combat the dissemination of extremist ideologies among the prison population and the wider community (Crisis Group, 2023). The study of the efficacy of terrorist attacks and counter-terrorism efforts has become a central subject in global security studies. The studies by Krause (2018) and Pape (2003) provide a framework for assessing the effectiveness of terrorist attacks from tactical, organizational, and strategic perspectives. The previous studies on the effectiveness of terrorist attacks did not include Indonesia as an area of research. This study will analyze terrorist attacks that occurred in Indonesia. This research presents a comprehensive analysis of multiple theoretical frameworks from prior studies, utilizing a comparative methodology. It aims to provide practical recommendations for improving counter-terrorism efforts and developing successful law enforcement strategies for future terrorism prevention in Indonesia.

METHOD

In this study, the author utilizes essential variables, including the number of assaults, deaths, injuries, financial impact, and political reactions, to assess the effectiveness of terrorist attacks in Indonesia. This article utilizes the effectiveness framework established by Krause (2018). This framework consists of three levels: the tactical, the organizational, and the strategic levels. Furthermore, it employs the notion of intrinsic motivations, as suggested by English (2016), to examine each situation. In addition, the author incorporates elements from Pape's (2003) strategic rationale for suicide terrorism. According to Pape (2003), the increase in suicide terrorism indicates that terrorist organizations have recognized the effectiveness of their activities in achieving their goals. The significant increase in suicide terrorism shows this phenomenon. In addition, terrorist groups use violence as a means of intimidating and spreading fear throughout the broader populace.

The efficacy of terrorism, however, cannot be shown by any actions that include the use of violence, threats, intimidation, or instilling fear among different segments of society. Hoffman's (2017) paper explores the broader ramifications of terrorist activities and examines the perspectives of other scholars about the success and ineffectiveness of such acts. In assessing the success of terrorist activities, it is crucial to evaluate whether they have achieved a comprehensive strategic triumph, a partial strategic victory, a tactical victory, or the inherent advantages of the conflict.

Insurgent and terrorist activities rely on individuals who possess a high level of organization and are part of established organizations to accomplish their goals. An instance of success in an organizational context is a primary kind of success. The vast majority of terrorist actions and almost all campaigns have been perpetrated by a group driven by its self-interest. The Government may face a situation where a significant percentage of the population harboring distrust towards them creates favorable conditions for terrorists to gain momentum. Supporters may use this distrust to accomplish their goals by creating divisions among the political opposition. A collective will initiate an assault to develop and maintain its reinforced base, demonstrating readiness to sacrifice and kill the foe. Furthermore, this approach enhances the organization's financial resources, personnel, supporters, and influence and facilitates sustainability. Blomberg (2011) states that terrorist organizations gauge their effectiveness by assessing many factors, such as their duration of existence, membership size, sponsorship, network connections, and alliances.

When addressing terrorism, "strategic efficacy" refers to the capacity to influence a country's fundamental character, governing principles, and inhabitants (Pape, 2003). Terrorist groups use acts of violence to pressure governments into halting military activities and to compel those who do not adhere to their ideology to leave (Krause, 2018). This action aims to establish an autonomous political entity or authoritarian regime within the targeted area (Hoffman, 2017). Terrorism may be strategically advantageous as a prerequisite for gaining organizational success through acts of terrorism, as it can inflict deaths and effectively convey opinions while also creating

divisions throughout society due to its dual capability for both actions (Abraham, 2006). In terrorism, the efficacy of tactical movements cannot be overstated. Using it makes it possible to succeed in either the organizational or strategic domain (English, 2016).

Tactical effectiveness refers to the capability to execute an assault with the precise amount and kind of violence at the designated place, against the intended target, and at the scheduled time. This study will use the theoretical analysis employed by English (2016) to assess the efficacy of terrorism. Specifically, the focus will be on analyzing all terrorist incidents in Indonesia since the nation's proclamation of independence. According to Oyewole (2021), it is unusual for terrorist organizations to achieve strategic success. This is because only a tiny proportion of terrorist groups have completed their ambitious goals, which are often based on ideology and require the government's consent. Indonesia has several terrorist organizations that have carried out acts of violence and instilled fear within its territory (Oyewole, 2021).

An examination of terrorism attacks in Indonesia and other nations reveals clear trends and consequences. For instance, the Bali bombings (2002-2005) had considerable global consequences and prompted a significant restructuring of Indonesia's counter-terrorism tactics. However, the outcomes of similar assaults in different nations have been diverse and influenced by specific political and socioeconomic circumstances. By utilizing the theoretical frameworks stated by Krause (2018) and Pape (2003), a comparative analysis of the tactical and strategic results of these terrorist attacks in Indonesia was conducted. The study highlights the unique difficulties and responses encountered in different circumstances. Indonesia's efforts in countering terrorism have been marked by notable progress, achieved via legislation reforms and active engagement in international cooperation. Nevertheless, the terrorist organizations in Indonesia continue to face limitations in their strategic accomplishments. This is consistent with global trends, where terrorist groups rarely achieve long-term ideological goals (Abrahms, 2006; English, 2016).

This study highlights the need to understand the tactical effectiveness of terrorist operations in achieving short-term objectives while recognizing the broader strategic limitations these groups face. The knowledge obtained from the comparative research provides valuable insights for enhancing counter-terrorism efforts in Indonesia and other areas.

DISCUSSION

Analysis of Key Terrorist Events:

Bali Bombings: 2002 and 2005

The Bali bombings were the most disastrous terrorist attacks in Indonesian history, which were executed by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a terrorist group affiliated with Al-Qaeda. Both bombings were tactically successful, causing significant casualties and economic disruption. The 2002 bombing killed 202 people and injured 209; a car bomb exploded outside the Sari Club in Kuta, Bali, followed

by a suicide bombing at Paddy's Pub. The attack targeted Western tourists, aiming to disrupt Indonesia's tourism industry, significantly contributing to the economy. The bombing resulted in a temporary decline in tourism, but the long-term impact on political goals was minimal. In the years after Osama bin Laden's declaration of war against the United States in 1996, suicide bombing became more popular as a form of self-sacrifice. This caused terrorist organizations that shared similar ideas to assume that attaching explosives to the bodies of non-believers was the most efficient approach to remove those who did not believe in their ideals (Moghadam, 2008). Specifically, Nasir and Putra (2023) highlight that this technique is consistent with the broader tendencies observed in other worldwide jihadist movements. To instill panic, generate media coverage, and disrupt economies, the spotlight is placed on major attacks that have caused significant damage.

A total of twenty people lost their lives, and an additional 129 individuals sustained injuries because of the explosion that took place in 2005. Three suicide bombers detonated their explosives in two restaurants situated at Jimbaran Beach Resort and Kuta (Jones, 2005). The assault strategy was indistinguishable from the terrorist incident that took place in 2002 (Crisis Group, 2005). While this attack was not as deadly as the bombing that took place in 2002, its purpose was still to cause more disruption to the tourism economy (Jones, 2005). Although the initial economic impact was significant, the strategic political objectives were not accomplished (Crisis Group, 2005).

The choice of high-profile tourist areas maximized media coverage and psychological impact. As Crenshaw (2000) notes, the tactical success of such attacks lies in their ability to generate immediate fear and widespread attention. Krause (2018) also emphasizes that tactical success is achieved when attacks are executed at the right time and place to maximize their impact. Hoffman (2006) also stated that the use of terrorism is more successful than any other kind of political struggle in terms of causing fear and attracting the attention of the public. J.I. achieved increased recruitment and funding following these attacks. The bombings demonstrated the group's operational capabilities and ideological commitment, enhancing its reputation among extremist circles. Blomberg et al. (2011) argue that such incidents can bolster organizational cohesion and attract recruits. Krause (2018) further argues that organizational success can be measured by the group's ability to maintain its operations and expand its influence.

The bombings have failed to achieve their political objectives, such as implementing Sharia law in Indonesia or deterring U.S. military involvement in Muslim countries. Instead, they prompted a robust counter-terrorism response from both Indonesian and international authorities, strengthening international cooperation against terrorism. Rabasa et al. (2004) note that the attacks led to significant international support for Indonesia's counter-terrorism efforts. The establishment of Detachment 88 anti-terror was one of the instances on the brace of counter-terrorism effort cooperation with the US government. Krause (2018) suggests that strategic success is achieved when the political goals of the terrorists are realized, which was not the case in these incidents. The bombers and supporters gained

prestige and a sense of martyrdom within their extremist networks, believing their actions were secured with spiritual rewards (Jihad Fii Sabillillah). This is, along with the concept of martyrdom, a powerful motivational tool for terrorist organizations (Moghadam, 2009). Houmanfar and Ward (2012) discuss how the promise of eternal rewards can sustain terrorist motivations despite strategic failures.

The long-term impact of these bombings on Indonesia's tourism sector was significant. Mawdsley et al. (2004) highlight that the bombings severely disrupted Indonesia's tourism sector, a critical component of the Indonesian economy. The initial sharp decline in tourist arrivals following the attacks had long-lasting effects on local businesses and employment, and some countries declared tourism travel banned in Indonesia after the attacks. Whenever the two Bali bombings, 2002 and 2005, were tactically successful in causing immediate casualties and economic disruption, they failed to achieve their broader strategic objectives. The attacks highlighted the need for comprehensive counter-terrorism strategies that address immediate threats and long-term prevention, including economic resilience and recovery efforts.

2004 Australian Embassy Bombing

On September 9, 2004, a suicide bomber detonated a car bomb outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, killing nine and injuring over 150. The car bomb was detonated during the morning rush hour, maximizing the number of casualties and the psychological impact. The embassy, representing Australian interests, was a symbolic target, emphasizing J.I.'s opposition to Western influence in Indonesia. Despite the tactical success, the attack did not result in any policy changes by Australia, reinforcing the notion that such attacks are strategically ineffective—unfortunately, immediate casualties and extensive damage to the embassy and surrounding areas. Hoffman (2017) emphasizes that such high-profile attacks are designed to maximize media attention and spread fear.

Krause (2018) points out that tactical effectiveness can also be judged by the ability of the attackers to reach their intended targets and cause significant disruption. For J.I., the attack demonstrated its capability to target foreign interests in Indonesia, reinforcing its operational presence and attracting media attention. The incident underscored the group's ability to disrupt diplomatic relations and create international headlines.

As Bloomberg, Gaibullov and Sandler (2011) note, the attack galvanized the group's base and showcased its operational capabilities. Krause (2018) also argues that organizational success can be seen in maintaining operational capacity and resilience in the face of counter-terrorism measures. Strategically, the bombing failed to alter Australian or Indonesian foreign policies. Instead, it led to increased security measures and counter-terrorism efforts. Fortna (2015) suggests that such failures are common, as governments often respond to terrorism with heightened security rather than policy changes. Krause (2018) emphasizes that strategic success requires achieving political concessions,

which was not realized in this case. Participants in the attack were celebrated within JI as martyrs, enhancing their posthumous status. Houmanfar and Ward (2012) discuss how the promise of eternal rewards can sustain terrorist motivations despite strategic failures.

Powell (2004) explores the impact of terrorist attacks on political decision-making and public sentiment. Considering the Australian Embassy bombing, Powell's analysis provides valuable insights into why the attack did not result in policy changes but instead strengthened the determination of both the Australian and Indonesian governments to combat terrorism. The bombing highlighted the strength of governmental policies in the face of terrorism and the tendency of such attacks to foster unity rather than division.

2009 Jakarta Marriott and Ritz-Carlton Bombings

The coordinated bombings that occurred on July 17, 2009, at two luxury hotels in Jakarta resulted in nine deaths and over fifty injuries. According to the research conducted by Jones (2005) and Smith (2010), the explosions were targeted explicitly against multinational business executives who were attending hotel meetings. The assaults were intended to disrupt the economic stability of Indonesia and deter international investment. Due to meticulous preparation, the attackers used sophisticated measures to bypass hotel security. Despite the initial chaos and media coverage of the attacks, they had little long-term political impact, and there were no significant policy changes resulting from them, according to the Indonesian Police Report in 2009. The attention from global media has measured this attack as a tactical success. The high-profile nature of the targets ensured they got significant media coverage and instilled widespread dread as Ritz-Carlton is one of the most Five-Star popular hotels in the world. Crenshaw (2000) states that high-profile targets are chosen to optimize the psychological impact of the attack. According to Krause (2018), keeping the momentum of terrorists depends on their effective tactical operation. It is Similar to the statement by Rose et al. (2007), which discovered that by generating significant casualties and media attention, coordinated bombings, such as the Madrid train bombings in 2004, struggled to achieve their political goals. Pape (2003) argues that achieving operational success is crucial for sustaining the organization's momentum. Furthermore, Krause (2018) emphasizes that an organization's performance is shown by its ability to maintain operations and preserve group cohesion (Krause, 2018).

Despite the extensive media coverage, the attacks failed to secure significant political concessions. Conversely, the Indonesian Government intensified its efforts to counter terrorism, including enhanced cooperation with surrounding nations and expanded information sharing. According to Cronin (2011), the main reason such attacks fail to bring about political change is that they cannot do so. According to Krause (2018), achieving strategic success becomes challenging due to significant policy changes or political surrender, which must be evident in this context. The individuals responsible for the assaults were praised within their networks, enabling them to sustain

the ideological war regardless of the outcomes of the operations.

2016 Jakarta Attacks

On January 14, 2016, terrorists linked with ISIS carried out a series of explosives and shootings in Jakarta. This resulted in the deaths of four innocent individuals and caused injuries to 23 others. The militants used a combination of suicide bombers and firearm assaults, with a particular focus on a Starbucks café and a police outpost located near the Sarinah shopping center (Jones, 2016). The attacks were carefully orchestrated to cause substantial disruption and induce fear, using social media intentionally to amplify their impact (Smith, 2017). The immediate and efficient response by Indonesian law enforcement authorities, highlighting the need for swift police intervention, effectively reduced the duration and scale of the attack (Indonesian Police Report, 2016). The attack was tactically effective, resulting in a disturbance of normalcy and inciting fear among the community. Choosing a vibrant commercial area maximized the impact. Hoffman (2017) suggests that directing attention toward public spaces might heighten the perceived threat of terrorism across the broader population (Hoffman 2017).

Krause (2018) emphasizes that tactical success is achieved by executing well-coordinated and forceful attacks that disrupt daily routines and garner significant media attention (Krause, 2018). The attacks showcased ISIS's strategic expansion into Southeast Asia, bolstering its efforts in propaganda dissemination and recruitment inside the region. Hoffman (2017) noted that this expansion was vital for ISIS in demonstrating its global influence (Hoffman, 2017). Krause (2018) argues that attaining organizational success depends on the enlargement of the operating range and the ongoing execution of recruitment efforts (Krause, 2018).

The strategic impact was limited. The Indonesian Government enforced stricter counter-terrorism measures, thereby intensifying the isolation of extremist formations. This significant response corroborates Frontera's (2015) assertion that acts of terrorism often result in a heightened resolve by the victimized state to counteract the perpetrators or organizations behind the assaults (Frontera, 2015). Krause (2018) notes that strategic success becomes challenging when attacks fail to bring about the desired political changes (Krause, 2018). The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism analyses the influence of terrorist attacks, such as the 2016 Jakarta event, on the formulation of national security policies. The report on the 9/11 attacks emphasizes the long-lasting impact of terrorism on global security plans and underscores the necessity for comprehensive measures to combat it.

The 2018 Surabaya Bombings

The Indonesian government has implemented a comprehensive strategy to combat terrorism effectively. Enhanced authority was bestowed upon security forces by implementing new legislation,

complemented by heightened community vigilance initiatives. This response aligns with the pattern observed in other countries, where significant acts of terrorism have led to the adoption of heightened security measures rather than political concessions.

Hwang (2023) stated that Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) has presented an important insight into evolving operational strategies and how they threaten society. JI has proven to be remarkably resilient, constantly changing its strategy and unwavering in its ideological dedication to its strategies for facing the counter-terrorism effort. The group's unwavering adaptability and flexibility in operation pose a persistent threat in Indonesia and the broader Southeast Asian region. It is noteworthy to see how certain groups, like JAD, continue to carry out sophisticated attacks despite increased security measures, showcasing their resilience and adaptability.

The consequences of the Surabaya bombings highlighted the strategic constraints. Despite facing initial challenges, JAD managed to achieve its long-term goals. In contrast, the Indonesian government's response showcased the resilience and efficiency of state institutions in their fight against terrorism. This response supports the findings by Rose et al. (2007), which stated that the 2004 Madrid train bombings failed. Despite that, they play a role in intensifying counter-terrorism efforts and fostering cooperation between countries.

The Oikumene Church Attack in Samarinda occurred in 2016.

The Oikumene Church in Samarinda, East Kalimantan, was targeted by a member of Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (JAD), an organization associated with ISIS, on November 13, 2016. The assailant launched a Molotov cocktail at the church when a service was taking place, causing the demise of a two-year-old girl and inflicting injuries on three other children. The assault generated substantial public indignation, primarily as a result of the deliberate victimization of minors and the desecration of a religious sanctuary, so accentuating the savagery of the assailants.

Pape (2003) indicates that the attack was strategically successful, employing a straightforward yet efficient approach to inflict casualties and instill fear (Pape, 2003). The strike showcased JAD's operational range and capacity to carry out attacks despite continuous counter-terrorism endeavors. Nevertheless, according to Krause's theory, the onslaught failed to accomplish substantial political or ideological objectives. However, it resulted in heightened security protocols at places of worship and an enhanced counter-terrorism reaction, indicating a strategic inadequacy in attaining broader political goals (Krause, 2018). The attack emphasized the significance of community monitoring and collaboration with authorities to prevent such attacks.

The Makassar Cathedral Bombing occurred in 2021.

On March 28, 2021, the Sacred Heart of Jesus Cathedral in Makassar, South Sulawesi, was subjected to a suicide bombing carried out by two individuals affiliated with Jamaah Ansharud

Daulah (JAD), an organization associated with ISIS. The assailants made an effort to gain access to the cathedral during a Palm Sunday service. However, they were thwarted by the security personnel, prompting them to trigger their explosives at the entryway. The explosion resulted in the deaths of the two individuals who carried out the bombing and caused injuries to 20 other individuals, including church attendees and security staff. This incident caused considerable disturbance and instilled terror within the local community.

The Makassar Cathedral bombing was strategically successful, as it adhered to attacking symbolic locations to cause the most casualties and attract media coverage (Pape, 2003). The strike demonstrated JAD's operations proficiency and intense dedication to its mission. Nevertheless, as per Krause's theory, the bombing failed to accomplish broader strategic goals. The attack prompted a heightened counter-terrorism reaction, which involved apprehending additional members of JAD. However, it did not lead to political compromises or substantial policy changes (Krause, 2018). This exemplifies the broader trend of terrorism having minimal strategic efficacy, emphasizing the necessity for solid counter-terrorism policies and community resilience to reduce the impact of such acts.

Comparative Analysis with Other Countries:

United States: 9/11 Attacks

The terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, targeting the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, had a profound impact on the formulation of national security policies in the United States. The 9/11 attacks orchestrated by Al-Qaeda led to a substantial loss of life and inflicted severe economic harm. The attacks also demonstrated Al-Qaeda's proficiency in orchestrating extensive operations, further enhancing its standing as a skilled practitioner of organizational strategies. Krause (2018) emphasizes the significance of thorough planning and accurate implementation to attain tactical success through a powerful attack.

Strategically, the attacks did not accomplish their intended goal of compelling the United States to retreat from the Middle East. Instead, the United States launched the War on Terror, which entailed military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, leading to substantial harm to Al-Qaeda's operational infrastructure. Krause (2018) argues that the interpretation emphasizes the strategic failure of 9/11, attributing it to the U.S. government's strong military and political response that effectively prevented Al-Qaeda from achieving its goals.

In response to the devastating events of 9/11, the United States implemented a variety of counter-terrorism measures to strengthen its security significantly. These actions involved establishing the Department of Homeland Security and implementing the USA PATRIOT Act. Engaging in vigilant surveillance, exchanging intelligence, and coordinating with various law enforcement agencies prevented other large-scale attacks. The U.S. Department of State (2010)

provides a thorough examination of the evolution of U.S. counter-terrorism strategies following the devastating events of 9/11. It highlights the increasing focus on international cooperation and the gathering of intelligence.

Spain: Madrid Train Bombings

The tragic events that unfolded on March 11, 2004, saw the loss of 191 innocent lives and left more than 2,000 individuals injured. The bombings proved to be highly impactful, causing a substantial number of casualties and creating widespread disruption in the capital of Spain. The bombings highlighted the operational capabilities of Islamist militants in Europe. In his analysis, Krause (2018) highlights the importance of strategically coordinating time and positioning to achieve tactical success, particularly during peak traffic hours.

The bombings had a profound effect on Spain's national elections, leading to the choice of withdrawing Spanish troops from Iraq. This event was a rare instance where terrorism achieved a significant political outcome. In a scholarly analysis, Krause (2018) suggests that the timing of the Madrid bombs played a crucial role in their strategic success. By strategically scheduling the attacks before the elections, they could effectively shape public opinion and ultimately change policy. The Spanish Government has implemented measures to enhance its counter-terrorism infrastructure, focusing on intelligence gathering and fostering international collaboration. Establishing the National Centre for the Coordination of Counterterrorism (CNCA) has significantly improved various agencies' coordination and response capabilities.

Chari's (2004) analysis focuses on the political ramifications of the Madrid bombings, highlighting how acts of terrorism can significantly influence election outcomes and shape policy decisions. Jordán (2006) explores the investigative findings and policy adjustments that followed the bombings, emphasizing the importance of effective tactics in countering terrorism.

United Kingdom: 7/7 London Bombings

On 7 July 2005, a suicide bomber struck London's public transport system, wounding more than 700 people and killing 52. Significant casualties and widespread anxiety were caused by the attacks, which were tactically effective. The blasts highlighted the danger that domestic terrorists represent. According to Krause (2018), the coordinated assaults on public transport that maximized disruption and casualties were the key to tactical success.

Regarding strategy, the bombs still needed to change Britain's stance on global affairs. Public resistance against terrorism and more counter-terrorism measures were the results, rather than vice versa. Because the assaults failed to bring about the intended policy shifts, according to Krause (2018), the strategic failure was apparent. By establishing the Office for Security and Counterterrorism (OSCT) and putting the CONTEST strategy into action, the United Kingdom

fortified its approach against terrorism. The decrease in the impact of terrorist threats can be initiated by increasing monitoring, community policing, and international collaborations with other countries. London bombings have brought massive attention to strengthen counter-terrorism efforts and global cooperation by comparing the results of investigations and policy shifts in the aftermath of significant terrorist acts (Jordán, 2006)

This research has found that terrorist attacks have had significant global repercussions, influencing the development of security policies and strategies to combat terrorism. In Indonesia, there have been several notable attacks that have underscored the ongoing struggle against terrorism. The attacks have varied in terms of their tactics, organization, and overall strategic impact. This evaluation aims to thoroughly analyze these significant events, using the frameworks of Pape (2003) and Krause (2018) to assess their effectiveness from different perspectives. The table below is a comprehensive analysis of major terrorist attacks in Indonesia, examining their tactical outcomes, organizational consequences, and strategic impacts.

Attacks	Target	Perpetrators	Casualties	Method	Tactical Effectiveness (Pape, 2003)	Organizational Effectiveness (Pape, 2003)	Strategic Effectiveness (Pape, 2003)	Tactical Effectiveness (Krause, 2018)	Organizational Effectiveness (Krause, 2018)	Strategic Effectiveness (Krause, 2018)
2002 And 2005 Bali Bombings	Tourist Areas in Bali	Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Linked to Al Qaeda	2002: 202 Killed, 209 Injured; 2005: 20 Killed, 129 Injured	Car Bomb and Suicide Bombers	High-Profile, Maximum Casualties, Significant Media Attention	Showcased Operational Capabilities, Attracted New Recruits	No Political Concessions, Stronger Counter-Terrorism Response	Timing And Location Maximised Impact	Maintained Operations, Reinforced Reputation	No Political Concessions, Enhanced Security Measures
2004 Australian Embassy Bombing	Luxury Hotels in Jakarta	Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)	9 Killed, over 150 Injured	Car Bomb	High-Profile, Maximum Casualties, Significant Media Attention	Demonstrated Capability to Target Foreign Interests	No Policy Changes, Increased Security Measures	Timing And Location Maximised Impact	Maintained Operational Capacity And Resilience	No Political Concessions, Enhanced Security Measures
2009 Jakarta Marriott and Ritz-Carlton Bombings	Tourist Areas in Bali	Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Linked to Al Qaeda	9 Killed, over 50 Injured	Suicide Bombers	Significant Casualties, Global Media Attention	Maintained Operational Momentum Despite Crackdowns	No Significant Political Impact, Stronger Counter-Terrorism	High-Profile Targets, Significant Media Coverage	Showcased Ability to Maintain Operations	No Significant Political Shifts, Stronger Counter-Terrorism
2016 Jakarta Attacks	Starbucks Café and Police Outpost in Jakarta	Isis-Linked Terrorists	4 Killed, 23 Injured	Suicide Bombers and Firearms	Significant Casualties, Disruption of Normalcy	Showcased Strategic Expansion into Southeast Asia	Limited Strategic Impact, Stronger Counter-Terrorism	Well-Coordinated Attacks, Significant Media Attention	Boistered Efforts in Propaganda and Recruitment	Limited Strategic Success, Stronger Counter-Terrorism
2016 Oikumene Church Attack	Oikumene Church in Samarinda	Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (Jad), Linked to Isis	1 Child Killed, 3 Children Injured	Molotov Cocktail	Simple Yet Effective, Caused Casualties and Generated Fear	Demonstrated Operational Reach Despite Counter-Terrorism Efforts	No Significant Political Changes, Increased Security Measures	Selected Vulnerable Target, Significant Media Attention	Maintained Presence Despite Counter-Terrorism Efforts	No Significant Political Goals Achieved, Increased Security
2018 Surabaya Bombings	Three Churches and Police Headquarters in Surabaya	Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (Jad), Linked to Isis	28 Killed (Including Attackers), Over 50 Injured	Suicide Bombings	High-Profile, Maximum Casualties, Significant Media Attention	Showcased Operational Capabilities, Attracted New Recruits	No Political Concessions, Stronger Counter-Terrorism Response	Timing And Location Maximised Impact	Maintained Operations, Reinforced Reputation	No Political Concessions, Enhanced Security Measures
2021 Makassar Cathedral Bombing	Sacred Heart of Jesus Cathedral in Makassar	Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (Jad), Linked to Isis	Two Attackers Killed, 20 Injured	Suicide Bombing	Targeted Symbolic Site, Maximised Casualties and Media Attention	Highlighted Operational Capability and Commitment to Cause	No Political Concessions, Intensified Counter-Terrorism Response	Targeted Symbolic Site, Maximised Impact	Demonstrated Operational Proficiency	No Political Shifts, Stronger Counter-Terrorism Measures
United States Of America 911 WTC Attacks	World Trade Centre in New York	Al Qaeda	2997 killed, 6000 Injured	Hijacked Airplane	High-profile, maximum casualties, significant media attention, with a meticulously planned and executed attack	Showcased Al-Qaeda's operational capabilities and attracted new recruits	No political concessions but led to a global War on Terror and extensive counter-terrorism measures	Timing and location maximized impact, causing extensive damage and casualties	Maintained Operations, Reinforced Reputation	No Political Shifts, Stronger Counter-Terrorism Measures
Spain Madrid Bombings	Commuter Trains in Madrid	Al Qaeda	193 Killed, 2050 Injured	Backpack Bombs	High-Profile, Maximum Casualties, Significant Media Attention	Showcased Operational Capabilities, Attracted New Recruits	No political concessions, but increased counter-terrorism efforts	Timing and Location Maximised impact	Maintained Operations, Reinforced Reputation	No Political Shifts, Stronger Counter-Terrorism Measures
London Bombings	Public Transport in London	Al Qaeda	52 Killed, over 700 Injured	Suicide Bombers	High-Profile, Maximum Casualties, Significant Media Attention	Showcased Operational Capabilities, Attracted New Recruits	No political concessions, but increased counter-terrorism efforts	Timing and Location Maximised impact	Maintained Operations, Reinforced Reputation	No Political Shifts, Stronger Counter-Terrorism Measures

Table 1. Comparative Analyses of Terrorist Attacks in Indonesia and Other Terrorist Attacks

CONCLUSION

According to the analysis of this study, although finally failing to reach their strategic goals, terrorist acts in Indonesia have shown notable tactical and organizational gains. The tactical victories attained—marked by significant casualties, extensive media coverage, and disturbance of normal conditions—showcase the operational knowledge of some companies. These strikes have greatly improved the groups' standing, focused their recruiting efforts, and increased their financial resources, underscoring their outstanding organizational skills.

A comparative study with other nations, like the United States, Spain, and the United Kingdom, highlights the crucial role of police and counter-terrorism policies in reducing the influence of terrorism more and more. Reaction to major terrorist events in these nations has underlined the need for more intelligence collecting, community involvement, and interagency coordination. Strong counter-terrorism policies can destroy terrorist networks, stop the next strikes, and hence lower the general potency of terrorism as a tool for political transformation. This underlines the need for world unity in this struggle and the significant part of international collaboration in combating terrorism.

In summary, most terrorist acts in Indonesia have been unsuccessful in achieving their political objectives. Their primary aim is to gain recognition for their ideology as the nation's foundation, not only from the government but also from society. By that means, terrorist attacks in Indonesia cannot fulfil their goals in terms of changing the incumbent government ideology with the Islamist government. There is only ten per cent of terrorist attacks in the world can achieve their goals. They are only counterproductive by self-proclaimed based on their religious belief, which is Jihad Fi Sabillilah as their standard (Abrahms, 2018).

REFERENCES

- Abrahms, M. (2006). Why terrorism does not work. *International Security*, 31(2), 42-78.
- Abrahms, M. (2018). Terrorism works in theory but not in practice. In Muro, D. (Ed.) *When Does Terrorism Work?* (pp. 16-32). Routledge.
- Abuza, Z. (2023). Jemaah Islamiyah: A continuing threat. *Journal of Counter-Terrorism Studies*.
- Bergen, P. L. (2024, August 2). *September 11 attacks*. Encyclopedia Britannica. <https://www.britannica.com/event/September-11-attacks>
- Blomberg, S.B., Gaibullov, K., & Sandler, T. (2011). Terrorist group survival: Ideology, tactics, and base of operations. *Public Choice*, 149(3-4), 441-463.
- Chari, R. (2004). The 2004 Spanish election: Terrorism as a catalyst for change? *West European Politics*, 27(5), 954-963.
- Counter Extremism Project. (2023). Indonesia: Extremism and Terrorism. <https://counterextremism.com>
- Council of Councils. (2014). Indonesia's struggle against terrorism. <https://cfr.org>
- Crenshaw, M. (2000). The psychology of terrorism: An agenda for the 21st century. *Political Psychology*, 21(2), 405-420.
- Crisis Group. (2002, October 24). *Impact of the Bali bombings*. International Crisis Group. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/impact-bali-bombings>
- Cronin, A.K. (2011). *How terrorism ends: Understanding the decline and demise of terrorist campaigns*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Djumantera, S., Basir, & Zulfa, E.A. (2023). Strategi Polres Poso dalam pencegahan gerakan radikal dan terorisme. *Journal of Indonesian Criminology*, 15(2), 117-128. <https://jurnalptik.id/index.php/JIK/article/view/336/113>
- Freedman, L.D., Pape, R., & Bloom, M. (2005). Dying to win: The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. *Foreign Affairs*, 84(5), 172.
- Frontera, J. (2015). State responses to terrorism. *HLS PILAC*. <https://pilac.law.harvard.edu>
- Fortna, V.P. (2015). Do terrorists win? Rebels' use of terrorism and civil war outcomes. *International Organization*, 69(3), 519-556.
- Gould, E.D., & Klor, E.F. (2010). Does terrorism work? *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 125(4), 1459-1510.
- Hoffman, B. (2017). *Inside terrorism* (3rd ed.). New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Houmanfar, R., & Ward, T. (2012). An interdisciplinary account of martyrdom as a religious practice. *Revista Latinoamericana De Psicologia*, 44(1), 65-75.
- Hwang, J. C. (2023). Jemaah Islamiyah and the ambiguities of disengagement from violence. *Oxford Academic*. <https://academic.oup.com>

- Javier Jordán, R.W. (2004, March 11). The Madrid attacks: Results of investigations two years later. *Jamestown.org*. <https://jamestown.org/program/the-madrid-attacks-results-of-investigations-two-years-later/>
- Jones, S. (2005). Indonesia: The Bali bombings. *International Crisis Group*. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/indonesia-bali-bombings>
- Jones, S. (2016). The January 2016 Jakarta attack and ISIS' threat to Indonesia. *International Crisis Group*. <https://crisisgroup.org>
- Krause, P. (2018). When terrorism works. In *When Does Terrorism Work?* Routledge, 33-51.
- Krause, P. (2018). The causes of terrorism: Strategies and outcomes.
- Mawdsley, N., Piza-Lopez, E., & Kaiser, K. (2004). Bali beyond the tragedy: Impact and challenges for tourism-led development in Indonesia.
- Moffat, S. (2007). Globalisation, terrorism, and cosmopolitan Australia. *Security Challenges*, 3(1), 1-8.
- Moghadam, A. (2009). Motives for martyrdom: Al-Qaida, Salafi jihad, and the spread of suicide attacks. *International Security*, 33(3), 46-78.
- Nasir, M., & Putra, F. (2023). New terrorism? A study on ISIS (Daesh), Al-Qaeda, and MIT's religious terrorism movement in the post-9/11. *Journal of Counter-Terrorism Studies*, 17(2).
- Pape, R.A. (2003). The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. *The American Political Science Review*, 97(3), 343-361.
- Powell, C. (2004). Did terrorism sway Spain's election? *Current History*, 103(676), 376-382.
- Rabasa, A., Benard, C., Chalk, P., Fair, C., Karasik, T., Lal, R., Lesser, I.O., & Thaler, D. (1999). *The Muslim world after 9/11*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
- Rose, W., Murphy, R., & Abrahms, M. (2007). Does terrorism ever work? The 2004 Madrid train bombings. *International Security*, 32(1), 185-192.
- Smith, P. (2010). Terrorism and economic stability: The Jakarta bombings.
- Smith, P. (2017). Social media and terrorism: How ISIS uses Twitter and Facebook.
- The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (n.d.). Background report: 9/11 ten years later. https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/announcements/BackgroundReport_10YearsSince9_11.pdf
- U.S. Department of State. (2010). Country reports on terrorism 2010. <https://state.gov>